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THE TRAGEDY IN TORTS
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.t
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal injury cases are frequently compelling. The facts draw the
relevant audience into the particular human tragedies out of which the legal
disputes arise. Accidents change lives and, in personal injury litigation, the
victims of accidents demand the legal system to hold someone else financially
responsible for the changes those accidents have caused. Part of what makes
these legal battles so compelling is the tension inherent in the adversarial
system, a tension provided by the conflicting factual and legal perspectives the
plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) bring to the case. These vying perspectives
supply a friction which commonly rises to the level of true social drama.
In personal injury suits, legal rules fade out of view. Broad standards,
like the "reasonable person' and "unreasonably dangerous," occupy decision-
makers, not particularized dogma, like the mail box rule or the rule against
perpetuities.1 Consequently, decision-makers in accident cases have more
legal room within which to roam. Tort law2 itself provides the decision-maker
with its great freedom to mete out "justice" in the particular case before the
court. Arguably then, tort law is more responsive than other areas of private
law to the specifics of the dispute and to the personalities involved.'
Torts' flexible responsiveness both results from and breeds the process
of personal injury litigation. That process is dramatic; it is literary - it
involves the unfolding of a story. Actually, it generates many stories, as many
t Professor of Law, LSU Law Center.
' The generality of tort law is what makes it responsive to particular events and what
simultaneously makes it so troublesome because of its uncertainty. Careful examination might
indicate other areas of law may bejust as uncertain. What usually distinguishes these other
areas is that their generality is a tad more shrouded. The generality of torts is right out in the
open. Yet, tort's overt invitation to decision-makers to "do justice" in the particular case is one
of its distinctive strengths.
2 In this piece when I speak of tort law I am referring to that body of law most usually
relevant in personal injury cases, i.e. negligence and strict product liability in tort. Thus, my
discussion does not implicate most intentional torts, defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud,
interference with economic gain (or contract, except insofar as I do discuss the economic harn
rule in Section V), or fraud. Likewise, to keep the discussion limited I do not discuss liability
for engaging in an ulrabazardous or abnormally dangerous activity. See generally, Thomas C.
Galligan, Strict Liability in Action: The TruncatedLearned Hand Formula, 52 LA. L. REV.
323, 335-39 (1991).
3 What does all this mean? It means that in tort law one sees what appears to be more
case specific, less predictable, and more inconsistent results than are characteristic of other
areas.
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stories as there are agents involved in the relevant accident. At the trial,
society's representatives listen to those stories. In the end, state sanctioned
decision-makers pick one version of the story and so resolve the matter. This
resolution results, more often than not, from the application of one of tort's
expansive standards, such as the reasonable person, to the particular facts.
When the resolution results from the decision of a jury the law behind the case
is hidden in the jury room, hidden behind broad, general, jury instructions full
of words like "reasonable," "unreasonable," "foreseeable," "remote," "natu-
ral," "probable," "cause," and "proximate." Where the judge is the applicable
decision-maker her decision is couched in similarly broad, metaphorical terms.
This is so whether the judge decides the case as factfinder or as law giver.
Indeed where issues of proximate cause or duty/risk are involved it is often
hard to distinguish fact from law from mixed law and fact. Appellate deci-
sions in many tort cases are no more precise.
To reiterate this piece's leitmotif, in personal injury cases plaintiffs
petition the government for redress; that petition is personal and specific. The
plaintiff sues not so much as a part of a class or group but on his or her own
behalf. She tells her story, not someone else's story. She demands compensa-
tion from some other, specific person. Likewise, the defendant tells its story.
Sometimes, the defendant is an entity, or the defendant is represented by an
insurance company. But, even then, the defendant tells its story through the
voice of the responsible corporate agent, be she managing agent or delivery
person. By like token, when the insurer is paying the defense lawyer and
facing a potential judgment, the story the court hears is the insured's story, not
the insurer's.
What is the importance of the specific story in tort cases? The specific
story dominates the stage. The law's generalized standards accommodate the
details of the case. Broad standards invite particularistic, event specific
versions of what happened. The detailed story matters more than it might in
a legal landscape of detailed, particularistic rules. When the story matters, the
individuals matter. The litigants and those whom they call as witnesses
become actors in a play, a play about what happened, and each of the charac-
ters matter. Not only do they matter as parties to a lawsuit but they matter as
individuals. Like characters in a play or story the parties display real, human
characteristics. The litigants and witnesses, as characters, reveal traits that
interest us. These traits provide the depth that makes the characters interest-
ing; without their own particular human traits they are caricatures, not real
characters.
Paradoxically, while detail provides specificity and uniqueness it
simultaneously opens out to commonality and similarity. Falling back on
cliches, each person's uniqueness is part of what makes him or her like
everyone else. While people share general physical and mental traits the
variations among us are infinite, i.e., our tastes, what we believe, what we are
afraid of, how we love, the combination of these and other characteristics. In
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an odd sort of a way we share our uniqueness. I am certain, to the extent that
is metaphysically possible as I write this, no one has ever or will ever be me.
There are people who look like me and talk like me and laugh like me and
think like me, but no one with the same, precise combination of attributes.
My children crinkle their brows in a way I have watched in the mirror. When
my children laugh or play or face fear I know their feelings. But while we are
alike we are also ineluctably and ineffably different. They are them and I am
me. There has never been another me and, miraculously enough, each of them
is just as unique and different as I am. By being different we are the same.
In our culture we place a high value on personal identity, not just
personal liberty per se, although that is part of the package I am talking about.
Ironically, as I perceive the uniqueness of another I appreciate my own
individuality more. Tautologically, as a result, I value the uniqueness of that
other person more. To further pile syllopcism on syllopcism, focusing on the
individuality of another illogically highlights the common link we share.
Psychologically, awareness of the common link makes me better able to
empathize with that other - the empathic reaction is compassionate.
Circuitously then, emphasis on individuality, a trait we all share, points to
commonality which, in turn, produces compassion.
Returning to the development of detail in story, one comprehends its
importance. Detail puts meat on the bones of the character's skeleton. The
provision of detail allows the reader or observer to consider the character as
someone more real. That reality stems from the character's universal unique-
ness. Grasping the character in its uniqueness, we grasp what we see in
ourselves. We empathize. Thereafter, we are better able to see the world
through the character's eyes. Familiarity points to generality; it breeds
understanding and compassion.
Vicarious experience allows for another, related phenomenon which,
along with compassion, also arises out of empathy. Vicarious experience
allows one to see or "go through" an experience without actually going
through it. To wit, let me turn to Karen Armstrong's interpretation of Aris-
totle's view of the dramatic form of tragedy. Ms. Armstrong writes that:
[Aristotle's] . . . famous literary theory ... [was] that tragedy
effected a purification (catharsis) of the emotions of terror and pity
that amounted to an experience of rebirth. The Greek tragedies,
which originally formed a part of a religious festival, did not neces-
sarily present a factual account of historical events but were attempt-
ing to reveal a more serious truth. Indeed history was more trivial
than poetry and myt..... [T]here may or may not have been a
historical Achilles or Oedipus, but the facts of their lives were
irrelevant to the characters we have experienced in Homer and
Sophocles, which express a different but more profound truth about
the human condition. Aristotle's account of the catharsis of tragedy
1996]
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was a philosophic presentation of a truth that Homo religious had
always understood intuitively: a symbolic, mythical or ritual presen-
tation of events that would be unendurable in daily life can redeem
and transform them into something pure and even pleasurable.4
While Ms. Armstrong writes about the metaphysically revealing power
of tragedy, torts may well have a tragic value for our society. The tragedies of
the ancient Greeks dealt with mythic characters who were presented with
unendurable events. Both those events and how the protagonists dealt with
those events shed some metaphorical light on the meaning of life. Perhaps the
same is true of torts.
In real life personal injury cases modem America is confronted with the
plight of young Mr. Grimshaw,5 seriously burned in a Ford Pinto, with the
moral dilemma of holding a manufacturer liable for a risk it did not know of
at the time it designed its product.6 Thus we focus on the real life personal
disaster of Grimshaw, not the mythical, near psychotic self-absorption of
Achilles. In torts, we confront holding a manufacturer liable without fault, not
the blind guilt Sophocles and the Gods piled on Oedipus. But, in a way, the
real life actors in modem day tort suits occupy a mythical stage no less
meaningful than the one on which actors playing Achilles and Oedipus
performed. Like the protagonists in the Greek dramas Ms. Armstrong and
Aristotle discuss, the protagonists in our tort suits have endured the unendur-
able. By vicariously confronting those unendurable events, by considering
them after the fact, perhaps we redeem ourselves somehow. Perhaps a
society, by either awarding compensation or absolving one of liability,
symbolically states some truth about its core beliefs and its concepts of
justice.
By considering the details of particular cases, often involving terribly
irreversible injuries, we see not just the individual actors but how those
individuals also represent the rest of us. Like the reader of a tragedy we
experience empathy, seeing the world through a broader lens. The empathic
reaction, in tram, triggers a compassionate response in the individual case.
Case specific, compassionate justice is what the flexibility of torts potentially
provides.
In this piece I intend to examine some of the assumptions I have made in
the preceding paragraphs. For one, I intend in the next section, Section 1I, to
reiterate the inherent flexibility of the reasonable person standard. In so doing
I will note that the standard allows individual actors to tell their particular
4 K. ARMSTRONG, AHISTORY OF GOD, 37(1993).
I See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. App. 1978).
6See Gary C. Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict
Products Liability Cases, 77 NW. U. L. REv. 1 (1982).
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stories to judges and juries, free of some of the confines of traditional legal
doctrine. Next, in Section II, I will tum to some other ways in which torts
allows particular decision makers vast leeway in deciding particular cases.
Here, I will primarily discuss legal cause and some alternative approaches to
limiting liability. In Section IV, I will note the traditionally flexible role of
compensatory damages in tort cases, including awards for general damages,
like pain and suffering and mental anguish. Therein, I also discuss the case
specific justice contemplated by the modem doctrine of comparative fault.
Following that, in Section V, I note some historical and current limits on the
flexibility of personal injury law. In Section VI, I will re-consider what I have
written about torts, tragedy, generality, and compassion in light of modem tort
theory, setting forth some brief concluding remarks as well.
II. THE BENDABLE, BREATHABLE, UNBREAKABLE
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
In 1830s England, Menlove built a hay rick near the boundary between
his land and Vaughan's land. Despite repeated warnings of the risk of
combustion, Menlove did not move the hay rick. Instead, Menlove told
listeners his stock was insured and "he would chance it."7 The risk with
which Menlove was willing to gamble transpired. The rick burst into flames.
The conflagration consumed Menlove's barn and stables before jumping to
some cottages on Vaughan's property. The fire destroyed the cottages.
Vaughan sued Menlove in negligence to recover his damages.
The trial court instructed the jury that in determining whether Menlove
was negligent,' it must decide whether Menlove proceeded "With such
reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised under such circum-
stances."9 The jury found for Vaughan but the court ordered a new trial ("a
rule nisi... was obtained"l 0), concluding it was improper to hold Menlove to
a standard of ordinary prudence. Instead, the court should have told the jury
that the issue was whether or not Menlove had "acted bona fide to the best of
his judgment... ."I' Put differently, the basis for the new trial was essentially
that the court should have told the jury to determine negligence using a
subjective standard not an objective standard.
7 Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490,491 (1837).
8 Actually, the issue before the court was whether Menlove was grossly negligent;
however, for the modem reader the grossness of the negligence adds little.
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On appeal, the court reversed, and Chief Justice Tindal's opinion is now
frequently included or discussed in case books1 2 as one of the leading early
cases setting forth the reasonable person standard. In rejecting the subjective
standard, Tindal wrote:
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should
be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would
be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought
rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to
caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe. 1
3
Thus, the Chief Justice and the court rejected the best judgment of the
individual (the subjective standard) in favor of the reasonable person standard
(an objective standard) because, I take it, the subjective standard would be too
unpredictable and would allow for too much variation.
Instead of a subjective standard, we are left with and keep the objective
standard of the reasonable person under the circumstances. In reference
thereto, Prosser and Keeton write:
The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard
of behavior. Yet the infinite variety of situations which may arise
makes it impossible to fix definite rules in advance for all conceiv-
able human conduct. The utmost that can be done is to devise
something in the nature of a formula, the application of which in
each particular case must be left to the jury, or to the court. The
standard of conduct which the community demands must be an
external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good
or bad, of the particular actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the
same for all persons, since the law can have no favorites. At the
same time, it must make proper allowance for the risk apparent to
the actor, for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under
which he must act. The courts have dealt with this very difficult
12 See RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 129 (5th ed. 1990); M.
FRANKLIN AND R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 46 (5th ed.
1992); J. WADE, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
143 (9th ed. 1994).
13 132 Eng. Rep. at 493. One notes the Chief Justice is borrowing a metaphor. By 1837,
Selden had already complained that in equity, because of the Chancellor's vast discretion, one's
tight to relief varied with the size of the Chancellor's foot. See D.B. Dobbs, Handbook on the
Law of Remedies, § 2.2 at 61 n. 8 (Student Edition, 2d ed, 1993). One wonders whether
Tindal hoped he was keeping that type of discretion out of tort law by adopting an objective
standard. If so, one must conclude in retrospect that he failed.
[Vol.2:139
TRAGEDY IN TORTS
problem by creating a fictitious person, who never has existed on
land or sea: the "reasonable [person]... of ordinary prudence."' 4
Clearly, a standard, as opposed to a rule, seems desirable because it is
able to meet changing and unforeseeable circumstances." It allows the
factfinder to respond to the circumstances and to tailor its decision of what is
reasonable conduct to the particular circumstances before it. In their classic,
The Legal Process, Hart and Sachs discuss the difference between rules and
standards:
The most precise form of authoritative general direction may con-
veniently be called a rule.... [A] rule may be defined as a legal
direction which requires for its application nothing more than a
determination of the happening or non-happening of physical or
mental events -that is, determinations offact.
Unlike a rule, the application of a standard requires something more
than a determination merely of the happening or non-happening of
physical or mental events. It requires a comparison of the quality or
tendency of what happened in the particular instance with what is
believed to be the quality or tendency of happenings in like situa-
tions. A standard can be defined broadly as a legal direction which
can be applied only by making, in addition to a finding of what
happened or is happening in the particular situation, a qualitative
appraisal of those happenings in terms of their probable conse-
quences, moral justification, or other aspect of general human
experience.
Even more obviously than the inchoate rule, the standard involves a
postponement of the decision until the matter can be judged from the
perspective of the point of application. Indeed, unless elaborated it
'
4 W.P.KEETON,ETAL,PROSSERANDKEEToNON TORTS § 32, at 173-74 (5th ed. 1988).
"S One is reminded of the advent and inevitable demise of various "rules of law" courts
used to define negligent conduct Ultimately, Justice Holmes' view, see OLIVER W. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 99 (M. Howe, ed. 1963), that over time trial judges should need juries less
and less in negligence cases gave way to an approach that asked the jury in each case to
determine whether or not the defendant acted reasonably no matter what the judge herself
might have decided if acting as factflnder and no matter what decision on "reasonableness" was
reached by a &ctfinder in a previous case. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, "Hill v. Lundin
& Associates" Revisited: Duty Risked to Death? 40-64 (LSU Law Center Publications
Institute 1993).
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does more than this, and avoids even at that point the imprisonment
of general judgement in any precise verbal formula. The meaning of
standards such as "reckless," "generally fair and equitable," and
"due care" depend upon the feeling for the particular type of situa-
tion of the individual standard-applier. Different appliers may apply
them differently. The standard thus represents a looser form of
control than the rule.' 6
The looser form of social control, the standard, preserves and even
encourages flexibility.
But, why the presupposition of a uniform standard of behavior at all?
Why the need to hypothesize when we know human behavior may vary with
the direction of the wind? Why does the community demand an external,
objective standard? Why must the standard allegedly be the same for all
people? Why not use a subjective standard after all? The need for an external
standard, albeit one that postpones decision and defies certainty, may arise
from the notion that if the law held each of us to a subjective standard, each of
us would, in a way, be the judge of our own conduct. As part of a community,
no single person can decide what is acceptable conduct. A party cannot be
the judge in his own case. Put differently, a performer cannot be her own
audience. Even the libertarian who proclaims one's right to choose what is
best for him or her agrees that one's freedom to do as she chooses stops when
she injures her neighbor.' 7 Professor Ernest Weinrib, the modem champion
of Aristotle's theory of corrective justice, albeit with a natural rights flair,
notes that wrongful interference with the will and/or embodiments of the will
of another exposes the actor to liability in tort.'8
The desire to hold each of us to the same standard no doubt stems from
an underlying devotion to equality. All people are supposedly equal in the
eyes of the law. It appeals to our sense of what's right. It appeals to our
notion that equality of treatment is a good towards which we strive. It also
appeals to our idea that legal decisions ought to be based on abstract princi-
ples. It is consistent with the notion Professor Dan B. Dobbs articulated
when discussing equity: people in our democratic society believe justice
entails being held to a rule of law not to the discretion of some authoritative
individual.' 9 Moreover, to return to my dramatic/storytelling theme, the
16 HERBERT L. HART AND ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 157, 159 (Tentative
Draft 1958). Actually Hart and Sacks saw the reasonable person standard as a somewhat more
elaborated standard than due care. See id. at 159.
" See EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 130.
18 Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOwA. L. REv. 403 (1992).
19 DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 61-62 (2d ed. 1993).
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subjective standard would overemphasize the individual defendant My thesis
is generality leads to specificity which, in turn, leads back to generality. One
might conclude a subjective standard would not provide that jump from the
specific back to the general.
No doubt the desire to maintain the reasonable person standard as an
abstract principle is what has led the courts to guard the mythical reasonable
person so carefully. Jurors are not allowed to put themselves in the position
of the defendant and ask what they would have done.20 They are also not
allowed to put themselves in the plaintiffs position.21 They must, when
considering the defendant's conduct, decide what the hypothetical reasonable
person would have done, not what any particular person would have done.
Interestingly, this tendency ties in to my discussion in the introduction. By
focusing on the details of the conduct involved in the particular case, the jury
paradoxically moves beyond those sad details to the human condition in
general. Detailed consideration of facts leads to a deeper understanding of the
individuals involved which leads to a more meaningful understanding of the
human community involved, the community whose hypothetical standard is
the yard stick by which the factfinder measures the defendant's conduct. The
standard may act as the divining rod through which that translation from
specific to general occurs. I will return to these ideas again later.
For now, accepting the fact that society has devoted itself to an objective
standard for any number of reasons, let us consider the stark reality of that
standard's predictive meaning for primary behavior. Arguably, the standard
has little substantive meaning outside particular cases. In fact, it may have no
more real consistent substance than a subjective standard would have. The
objective standard requires each of us to act as a reasonable person under the
circumstances. But it is those particular circumstances that make each life
and each incident in each life unique. The circumstances make life interesting.
We are born; we live; we die. To make the story interesting, to make it worth
following, we yearn for more. We want to know the circumstances. We want
detail.
What I may permissibly do while driving on a dark night, on a lonely
road, on my way to the emergency room with my youngest child is radically
different from what's permissible while I drive home from work alone on a
crowded highway, trying to get to my "almost 40 and over" softball game.
What law do we get out of these hypotheticals? The closest I can come is the
20Freeman v. Adams, 63 Cal. App. 225, 218 P. 600 (Ct. App. 1923).
21 See, e.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P. 2d 673 (Cal. 1966); DOUGLAs F. LAYCOcK,
MODERNAMERICANREMEDIES 140 (1993).
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emergency doctrine which considers emergencies as circumstances meriting
special attention in determining reasonable care.22 Some help?2 3
Thus, the reasonable person "standard" invites the parties to a particular
dispute to point to the particularities of the incident at issue. These particular-
ities may include consideration of the relevant peculiar characteristics of the
defendant (even if de facto), or when contributory negligence is at issue, the
plaintiff.24 Thus, the parties are allowed to tell their versions not only of the
event but how the other party reacted to the event. They are allowed to
dramatically recreate the episode for the relevant decision maker. The
decision maker then renders a decision whose predictive value is typically
close to none; this is especially true in jury trials.2" The next case, even one
with remarkably similar facts, is governed not by the jury's decision in the
prior case but rather by the general "due care/reasonable person" standard.
That is, for the next story we go back to ground zero; we do not force the next
decision maker to pick up where the last one left off.
Importantly, the reasonable person standard allows tort law, as Hart and
Sacks noted, to defer decision. It defers decision until the trial so that the
factfinder determines what is reasonable "judged from the perspective of the
2See, e.g., KEETON ET. AL., supra note 14, § 33 at 196-97.
1 While the facts of individual cases vary, the law itself has expressly altered the
reasonable person standard by "codifying" certain circumstances. This is the case with the
"emergency doctrine" referred to above. By way of further example, the law has long taken
physical attributes into account in deciding what is reasonable care. The person who cannot see
is held to the standard of the reasonable person who cannot see. The person who cannot hear
is held to the standard of care of the reasonable person who cannot hear. Perhaps, most notable
of all is the fact that children, unless engaging in adult or particularly dangerous activities, Id.
§ 32 at 181-82, are held to the standard of children of like age, intelligence, and experience. Id.
at 179-82. Each child is essentially held to the standard of a hypothetical child who has her
attributes and background. This the spot where a subjective and objective standard truly merge.
Now, in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases, courts are wrestling with
using a reasonable woman standard when a female is the victim of alleged harassment. See,
e.g., Kathryn. Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1989); Naomi R.. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language, The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398 (1992).
Cf Ronald K. F. Collins, Language, History, and the Legal Process: A Profile of the
"Reasonable Man ", 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L. J. 311 (1977).
24 I use the phrase contributory negligence here to refer to plaintiff's failure to exercise
due care. I use it to include the relatively few jurisdictions where the effect of the plaintiffs
fault is to bar recovery or the vast majority where the effect of plaintiff s fault is merely to
reduce recovery. One will note that even in many comparative negligence jurisdictions if the
plaintiff's fault exceeds some specified level (either 50% in some or 49% in others) the effect
is to bar recovery.
' Where the judge decides the case as factfimder then perhaps the judge's decision has
more practical predictive value because the decision in the case may provide some insight into
the judge's values and biases; however, even then the predictive value has more to do with
what the particular decision reveals about the judge, not what it says about the "law."
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point of application.126 Critically, the factfinder's decision, its application of
the standard, may be based not so much on the cold logic of the law27 as on
the factfinder's feeling for the warm reality of the particular case. Here, once
again, it is important to note the particular words Hart and Sacks used to
describe standards and their application. They said, as I quoted above,
application of the standard depends upon the 'feeling for the particular type
of situation of the individual standard-applier." '28 The parties' respective
versions of the event evoke a feeling and, as Hart and Sacks noted, this
"feeling" is critical to the resolution of the case.
One may pause here with some concern. Aren't the factfinders supposed
to compare the conduct of the allegedly at fault parties with the abstract
standard of the reasonable person? Hart and Sacks seemed to contemplate
such a comparison. Whatever analytic process supposedly goes on, Professor
Grady has persuasively pointed out that the principled comparison between
ideal and actual is not what happens in practice. In his seminal article,
Untaken Precautions,29 Professor Grady argues that, in practice, lawyers
identify particular "untaken precautions" which then serve as the heart of the
case. The party claiming breach of the appropriate standard of care points to
some particular precaution which the defendant failed to take. That particular
alleged failure (or failures 0) then becomes the key to the case. Plaintiff says
the defendant should have taken the untaken precaution without which the
accident would not have occurred. Defendant claims the untaken precaution
may not have been reasonable behavior, or at least that what it did was
reasonable. The parties fight over the details. The detail makes the dispute
more concrete; it makes it more focused and it makes it more dramatic.
Rather than fight at the abstract level of the "standard of care of the reason-
able person," the parties argue over the details of what the reasonable person
would have done under the particular circumstances and what the reasonable
person might have done to prevent the accident.3
HART AND SACKS, supra note 16, at 157.
27 In a jury trial, the judge explains the "law" to the jury in a jury instruction on the
reasonable person standard that may take all of ninety seconds to read.
I HART AND SACKS, supra note 16, at 157 (emphasis supplied).
29 18 J. LEGAL STUDiES 139 (1989).
31 It seems more realistic to say "those failures" because parties frequently point to
multiple alleged incidents of particular negligence which their adversaries allegedly committed.
3MHere one notes the relevance of what is now probably the majority rule that a plaintiff
in a failure to design product liability case must establish there was some alternative design
which would have lessened or prevented the plaintiff's injuries in order to establish a prima
facie case. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:2800.56(1). This is the position which the drafters of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts-Product Liability have taken. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) oF THm LAW
OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LiABILITY § 2(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). While this rule is
relevant to the current discussion, I have several bones to pick with it, which I will save until
1996]
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Grady's untaken precautions analysis is important not only because it
emphasizes the rich detail of the actual case but also because, by emphasizing
the detail, it de-emphasizes the pure objectivity of Chief Justice Tindal's
objective standard. Applying, measuring, and even setting the standard of
care is much more case specific than Tindal's traditional theory would admit.
Not only is it specific because it takes account of the details of the surround-
ing circumstances, including party specific character traits, but also because,
according to Grady, application of the standard involves a decision between
what the allegedly negligent party actually did and some particular undone
thing it allegedly should have done. Thus, detail replaces broad principle.
The reasonable person standard, by definition, welcomes this detail. Indeed
it is the detail that makes things interesting.
Let me now pause and consider the reasonable person standard from two
post-modem perspectives: the Learned Hand formula's economic emphasis
and Professor Leslie Bender's feminist view of the standard. I turn first to
Judge Hand, and his disciples.
According to the Learned Hand formula one is negligent if the burden of
avoiding a risk is less than the probability of that risk occurring times the
anticipated gravity of the risk if it should arise.32 Thus, the actor is negligent
if the ex ante cost of avoiding the risk is less than the discounted "value" of
that risk.33 The Hand formula is an economic definition of negligence; under
the formula an actor is negligent if the marginal cost of a particular identified
untaken precaution, to use Professor Grady's term,34 is less than the marginal
benefit the untaken precaution would have provided.35 The Hand formula
supposedly encourages efficient investments in accident avoidance. In the
laboratory, it neither under- nor overdeters. Is the Hand formula consistent
with the storytelling/tragic role I have identified for tort law, particularly
negligence law?
I have contended that the reasonable person standard allows the jury to
decide particular cases in case specific ways. I have argued that the standard
we use to define the required care essentially frees the jury to decide the case
as it sees fit. The Hand formula, if applied per its theoretical basis, constrains
that freedom somewhat. Under the formula, the jury must expressly consider
costs and benefits, it is limited to a cost/benefit analysis of the case before it.
While the Hand formula has not totally replaced the generalized reasonable
Section V.
32See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
3 See Thomas C. Galligan, Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 14-23 (1991).
See Grady, supra note 29, at 140.
3 See Galligan, supra note 33, at 14-23.
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person standard,36 as Professor Stephen Gilles has pointed out, no court has
expressly repudiated the Hand formula and cost/benefit analysis has indeed
come to dominate the way scholars think about negligence and how many
courts talk about it.37 Thus, the Hand formula certainly cannot be ignored.
As noted, the formula's express reference to costs and benefits somewhat
limits the factfinder's ability to roam free amidst its own case specific sense
of justice.
I have contended above that part of the psycholiterary value of torts is to
allow the factfinder to focus on the details of the case before it, including the
details revolving around the parties before the court. After focusing on that
detail and only after focusing on that detail does the factfinder make a
decision in the case, i.e., for present purposes, whether the defendant acted as
the reasonable person under the circumstances. What a society studying tort
cases learns about humanity it learns by focusing on detail until detail triggers
some empathic response which, in turn, leads to some understanding about
more than just the details of the case before the court.
Alternatively, the Hand formula can be viewed as a utilitarian formula
striving to produce the greatest good for the greatest number. It encourages
efficient investments in accident avoidance and efficiency is supposedly good
for all of us. By encouraging efficiency in individual transactions or pseudo-
transactions, like accidents, society hopes for the greatest good for the greatest
number. Thus, unlike the focus on the individual that the story telling model
of torts contemplates, the Hand formula focuses on the individuals involved
and the incidents involved only as means to some greater end - efficiency.
As noted, the Hand formula is not value neutral. It encourages effi-
ciency. Tort cases are a means to an end - efficiency. The storytelling/tragic
view of negligence is more metaphoric. While not value neutral it contem-
plates the confluence of many values, all relevant values. It contemplates
value comparison or melding; it is not devoted to any one value. Like any
metaphor, it defies, in part, logical explanation.
Despite these apparent inconsistencies between the Hand model of
negligence and the storytelling model, the two models might still co-exist.
.Efficiency is a value in our culture. There is no disputing that; indeed, it is an
important value. One of the things the broad standards of negligence, like the
reasonable person, allow the factfinder to do, as Professor Catherine Pierce
Wells has pointed out,38 is to pour community standards regarding what is
"just" into the tort system as it decides particular cases. One of the values the
factfinder may, or perhaps even should, take into account in our society is
6See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 U. VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994).
37Id. at 1016.
" Catherine. P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for
Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990).
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efficiency. Thus, the Hand formula may be a factor, but perhaps not the only
factor in the factfinder's application of the reasonable person standard, i.e., in
the way the factfinder interprets the stories it hears from the parties and the
witnesses. Perhaps this is why, as Professor Gilles has noted, the Hand
formula has not replaced generalized due care language in jury instructions in
negligence cases.39
But if the Hand formula stands for only one value, why don't courts
expressly apply a combination of the Hand formula and the reasonable person
standard? To answer that question let me consider Professor Gilles' recently
articulated theory of the Hand formula. Gilles contends that the reasonable
person standard may serve as a heuristic. The American Heritage Dictionary
says heuristic is an adjective meaning: "Of or relating to a usually speculative
formulation serving as a guide in the investigation or solution of a prob-
lem. . ."40 As a noun then, a heuristic is something which may serve as a
guide to solving a problem. Here the reasonable person standard, as heuristic,
is a guide to defining negligence under the Hand formula. The heuristic (the
reasonable person standard) allows the jury to apply the Hand formula
without first converting the costs and benefits associated with risks and
untaken precautions into "utiles" (a standard unit of economic exchange)
which can be balanced against one another.4" Rather than convert to utiles,
the "reasonable person heuristic appeals to the factfinder's experience and
knowledge of the average community member's valuation of precautions and
safety risks." 2 Under the Gilles' model, the reasonable person standard is the
tort system's way to rely on "factfinder notice"43 of the utility or value
associated with the Hand factors rather than having to elicit expert testimony
on the subject." In that vein, the Hand formula and the reasonable person test
operate side by side. The Hand formula defines negligence and the reasonable
person standard facilitates the formula's application. The standard allows the
factfinder to weigh costs and benefits in "colloquial" terms. However, note
that under the Gilles' model, the Hand formula defines negligence. The
efficiency the formula strives to achieve is the end value negligence law
serves. Efficiency is not just one value a society may want to factor in as part
" Gilles, supra note 36, at 1016-19, 1022-24.
4 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLUSH LANGUAGE 849 (3d ed. 1992)
(first definition).
4' Gilles, supra note 36, at 1029-32.
42Id. at 1032.
431d.
" Of course, under the Gilles' theory one would conclude that even though the system
relies on factfinder notice, rather than expert testimony, in most cases expert testimony would
still be admissible, even in the run of the mill case.
[Vol.2:139
TRAGEDY IN TORTS
of a more or less metaphorical decision making process. Rather, it is the only
value negligence law should seek to achieve.
As I said, perhaps it is because tort law still views efficiency as just one
of the factors relevant to what is reasonable that the Hand formula has not
generally replaced "reasonable care" as the measuring rod for negligence.
Thus the Hand formula serves one value; the dramatic/storytelling "model"
accommodates many but with no prescription as to how to weigh those values
(or emotions). This is the critical difference between the Hand formula and
the storytelling model but one should also note an important similarity.
Although the Hand formula forces an analysis of costs and benefits and
strives to achieve one value - efficiency, its practical application, like the
stories parties tell, is potentially case specific. The Hand formula allows the
parties to focus in on the detailed costs and benefits at issue in the case before
the court. While I admit I am no economist, one of the few economic facts I
think I know is that almost everything can be valued. I will return later to the
idea of the incommensurable. But for now, assume almost everything can be
valued in some economic sense. Additionally, almost anything can be viewed
as a cost or benefit of something else. Thus, there are direct costs, informa-
tion costs, and transaction costs, to name a few. Consequently, given the
breadth with which economics paints, the Hand formula may not tie the hands
of the factfinder quite as much as one might at first believe. Perhaps people
consider costs and benefits of alternative modes of behavior whether they
consciously know it or not.45 Assuming that to be the case, the Hand formula
essentially tells juries in negligence cases to do what they would do anyway
without drastically limiting the power of the parties, their lawyers, or the
factfinder to use dramatic detail to tell the story of efficient and/or inefficient
conduct.
Now, as promised, let me pause over the idea of incommensurability.
The legal economist relies upon the notion that harm (or injury) can be
equated with a dollar value - that harm and money are commensurables.
Professor Radin has called this a comodified concept. She writes: "A
comodified conception of compensation, in which harm to persons can be
equated with a dollar value, coexists with a noncomodified conception, in
which harm cannot be equated with dollars. In the comodified conception
harm and dollars are commensurable, and in the noncomodified conception,
they are incommensurable." To simplify matters, we can assume awards for
lost past earnings and lost future earning capacity are commensurable with
dollars. We can also assume the same for past and future medical expenses,
which would include awards for medical monitoring. What are potentially
See Gilles, supra note 36, at 1032-34.
46 Margaret. J. Radin, Essay: Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L. J. 56
(1993).
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incommensurable in dollars are a person's past and future pain and suffering,
mental anguish, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life.47
What does this mean for the Hand formula? It seems that just as the
Hand formula has the capacity to consume4' the elements of negligence as we
knew them before law and economics championed the formula,49 the notion
that harm (personal injuries) and money are not commensurable shatters the
formula. This is because the formula depends upon society (courts and juries)
being able to somehow (if even intuitively) "value" harm in dollars. Both the
anticipated loss (L) and the burden of avoiding (B) loss require at least the
theoretical ability to value harm.5 If, in fact, harm and dollars are not
commensurable then damage awards for incommensurables are nothing more
than haphazard (random) guesses about what harm might be worth in dollars
if in fact the equation could be made, which it cannot.
Nor does Professor Gilles' hypothesis about what he calls "factfinder
notice" take care of this problem. He opines that reliance on factfinder notice
allows the jury to evaluate harm and safety in terms of community values
without the necessity of expert opinion (or precise Hand formula instructions).
However, the decision maker does make the valuation under Gilles' model.
If, in fact, there is no way to value harm in dollars there is no relevant fact of
which the factfinder has notice.51
Put simply, if harm and dollars are incommensurables, damage awards
for pain and suffering and emotional distress are either arbitrary or serve some
goal other than efficiency, or both. Some legal economists accept the notion
" The tort lawyer may conveniently think of these categories of damage as general
damages.
48 See Thomas C. Galligan, A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV.
1509, 1530 (1993).
49 See, e.g., Richard. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUDIES 29 (1972).
50 B requires one to be able to value harm because an alternative course of conduct may
pose a risk of another type of injury which the defendant's conduct avoided. Thus, in order to
accurately determine B, the decision maker must be able to pin a dollar value on those other
injuries which the alternative course of conduct may pose.
5' As Professor Gilles notes in part, "[t]here is a growing body of literature dealing with
the issue of whether some value are 'incommensurable' in ways that preclude cost-benefit
analysis, reasonable choices, or both." Gilles, supra note 36, at 1033, n.43. See also, Richard
H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2145-62 (1990); Donald
H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz 's "Morality of Freedom", 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 995, 1056-75 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MIc. L. REv. 779, 795-808 (1994). In the specific context of negligence law, John Fleming
has argued that the problem of incommensurability helps explain what he sees as the peripheral
status of cost-benefit analysis. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTs 109 (7th ed. 1987)
("[N]on-economic values, like health and life, freedom and privacy... defy comparison with
competing economic values."). I shall not address these issues here, though they are obviously
relevant to the ultimate coherence of cost-benefit analysis in negligence law.
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that in order to efficiently deter the tort system must award general damages.52
Otherwise, defendants will underinvest in safety and/or over engage in
dangerous conduct. 3 But if it is impossible to consistently measure some
harm in dollars because the two are incommensurable then it is hard (impossi-
ble) to see how the tort system, via the Hand formula, can ever be efficient.
Are general damages really incommensurable? To borrow a phrase from
the litigator, "money is all we have" to compensate the tort victim for his or
her non-pecuniary injuries. To explain, it is impossible to make the victim
whole or to do undo the suffering endured, however, money is at least some
expression of society's recognition of the victim's suffering. Indeed, if
factflnders do award general damage awards as a second best solution to the
problem of incommensurability then why at some point don't we develop a
sort of surrogate market in the value of harm? I think the answer is that we
do. Quantum studies and past experience allow lawyers to bargain over the
value of harm when they try to settle cases. The value of economic or special
damages incurred often plays a part in the guesstimation of the value of non-
economic harm suffered. Moreover, the power of the court to order additur
and remittitur54 as well as the power to enter a JNOV on quantum serve to
somewhat normalize awards. These facts suggest harm and dollars are not
truly incommensurable, thereby lending credence to the possibility of
employing the Hand formula, at least as a factor in the determination of
reasonable care.
However, simply because people have developed an ability to value non-
pecuniary harm in dollars, is that what we, as a society, want? Do dollars
represent all that we mean by an award of those dollars for pain, suffering, or
mental anguish? Or does the award, as the final decision in the case, represent
the decision maker's final resolution of the various specific versions of the
event it has heard? In this vein, one might conclude the final dollar award is
the best the decision maker can do with a bad situation. It has been told to
resolve the matter and it has done so. The award is not then purely the
"value" of the suffering endured but rather part of the sum total of the
decision maker's resolution of the dispute in an imperfect world. In a way, the
award is like the intuitive decision to wear blue, rather than red, next Thurs-
day.
Although I will talk about the subject of compensatory damages in more
detail in a subsequent section, a mythological reference may shed some light
on the present discussion of incommensurability. After the character God56
I See Posner, supra note 49.
5 Id.
I See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 21, at 187-89.
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
56Please note that I am not preaching here. God is the character's name in the story.
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put Job though the ringer, killing Job's wife and children, destroying Job's
crops, and then some, God tried to make it up to Job. But, in restoring Job,
God, the supposedly omniscient all powerful being that He" is in the story,
does not undo what He has done. Instead, God gives Job new crops and a new
wife and new children. Let me ask those readers who have a significant other
(or others) whether the loss of that person or persons and their subsequent
replacement with a new version is really the same thing as the old. I have to
believe the new and the old are incommensurable. Likewise, if one loses a
child and then has that child "replaced" with another, does the parent feel
whole in the sense of being in exactly the position he or she would have been
in if the first child had not been lost? Perhaps awarding damages for suffering
and anguish is like Zorba howling at the moon.5" There is no apparent point
to it. It will not change anything; however, it is a metaphoric way to express
outrage or sorrow or compassion. It is one way to at least try to do something
about it all. Of course, if harm and dollars really are incommensurable, one
might reasonably suggest that awarding damages for suffering may not be the
only or even the best remedy a society could provide. Professor Leslie Bender
has made some interesting suggestions on this point, postulating an obligation
of caregiving in specie might be preferable to damages.59 Professor Bender
has also raised some critical issues about the reasonable person standard
itself, to which I will now turn.
InA Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort,60 Professor Bender
criticizes the reasonable person standard on several fronts. First, she notes
"reasonable person" is simply a politically correct editorial revision of
"reasonable man."'" Thereafter, Bender points out that even if the standard
is now the "reasonable person" and not the "reasonable man" standard, it was
still developed for and by men.62 She argues the standard fails to adopt the
perspective of one-half the world's population. She writes: "[n]ot only does
'reasonable person' still mean 'reasonable man' - 'reason' and 'reasonable-
ness' are gendered concepts as well. Gender distinctions have often been
17 See C. JUNG, Answer to Job, in THE VIKING PORTABLE LIBRARY JUNG 519 (J.
Campbell ed. 1976).
58 Nios KAzANTZAICS, ZORi3A THE GREEK 59 (Carl Wildman trans. 1952).
59 Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L. J. 848 (1990).
' Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. OF LEG. ED. 3
(1988).
61 Anticipating one response, Bender notes that "man" is neither generic, gender neutral,




reinforced by dualistic attributions of reason and rationality to men, emotion
and intuition (or instinct) to women."63
Certainly, if the reasonable person standard denies to women the ability
to reason at all it is psychologically incorrect and innately discriminatory. We
all "reason." Additionally, despite its roots in the concept of reason, I believe
that the word "reasonable," when used as an adjective in the reasonable
person standard, means much more than simply the ability to reason. Instead,
I think, it now implies what we expect people to do under various circum-
stances. It implies we expect them to act in a reasonable manner, not a
manner characterized by the process of reasoning but more or less that we
expect them to act like a normal person would act under the same or similar
circumstances. Thus when we say that someone should act reasonably we are
not ordering them to undertake some rational, Aristotelian thought process but
rather we are asking them to behave the way an ordinary, normal (anonymous)
being with human characteristics would behave under the same circumstances.
Thus the word reasonable in the reasonable person standard is a whole lot
bigger than merely one who acts by reasoning. It implies notions of commu-
nity norms, both in regards to investments in safety and, I believe, in regards
to compassionate behavior toward one's coinhabitants on the planet. Conse-
quently, while I understand Professor Bender's objection to the word "reason-
able," I do not share her pessimism about the standard's ability to incorporate
precisely some of the perspectives she would like factfinders to more directly
bring to bear on the negligence question.64
Professor Bender would jettison the reasonable person standard of care.
She writes: "If we are wedded to the idea of an objective measure, would it
not be better to measure the conduct of a tortfeasor by the care that would be
taken by a 'neighbor' or 'social acquaintance' or 'responsible person with
conscious care and concern for another's safety'?"6 I do not object to
consideration of those factors when deciding just how careful someone ought
to be. I would welcome it. Nor would I object to instructing a jury concerning
those "values." My simple point is that the reasonable person standard does
not, as it is now used, expressly prohibit the jury from considering just those
types of factors when deciding how the parties before it should have acted in
the particular case. Mypoint is that the reasonable person standard is flexible
enough to allow the factfinder in a particular case to be swayed by the
compassionate values or perspectives that Bender argues ought to apply in
every case.
SId. at23.
I freely admit that my gender may be one of the reasons I am more forgiving of the
reasonable person standard than Professor Bender. Inevitably, while I may try to understand it,
I cannot truly share her perspective.
65Bender, supra note 60, at 25.
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Interestingly then, Bender is concerned because the reasonable person
standard overrates "reason" or "rationality," gender loaded terms, and
underestimates a more compassionate, empathic view of accident law.
Alternatively, Professor Gilles66 is concerned because the reasonable person
standard may not adequately inform factfnders about the role efficiency plays
in defining negligence. It is for that reason he would endorse "Hand Formula"
instructions to juries in negligence cases.67 Thus, Professors Gilles and
Bender object to the reasonable person standard for different philosophical
reasons, but for the same functional reason. The standard does not particu-
larly focus in on the values they see as most significant. It is for precisely that
reason that I applaud the standard and its vague generality. It allows all the
values that a compassionate society might want to consider in the determina-
tion of negligence to vie for a lead role in the particular case before the court.
It allows the relevant decision maker to look at the detail of the particular case
long and hard before falling upon the most relevant policies or emotions.
Indeed we might conclude that in many cases it is not the particular policies of
tort law that determine the outcome of the case but rather it is what the
particular decision maker deems the fairest outcome.
The "reasonable person" standard provides the decision maker with a
standard in the nature of metaphor. It allows consideration of many different
factors without forcing a logically oriented, hierarchical explanation of why
one factor or another is or ought to be preeminent. It allows for the unex-
plained conclusion that may be at the heart of many difficult decisions.
However, the standard also allows consideration of logical arguments and
efficiency concerns. Like any stew (or story), the standard allows the various
ingredients to simmer and mingle, effecting one another and the ultimate
product as they might.
Before leaving the reasonable person, however, let me tarry for one more
moment over the standard and Gilles' and Bender's views thereof. Interest-
ingly, Bender calls for a more compassionate articulation of the standard of
care. Gilles calls for a more efficiency oriented articulation of the standard.
However, Professor Gilles is not unconcerned with the costliness of self-
interest in an efficiency oriented world. He solves the problem by using the
"single owner" version of the reasonable person standard.68 Gilles says:
The device that enables the Hand Formula to rule while remaining
invisible is a modified reasonable person heuristic. The standard
described above calls for comparison between the value the average
" See Gilles, supra note 36.
671d. at 1054.
' See Richard Epstein, Holdout, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One more Salute
to Ronald Coase, 36 J. L. & Econ. 553 (1993).
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injurer would assign to precaution costs and the value the average
victim would assign to the expected accident costs eliminated by the
precaution. Because the average injurer and the average victim,
taken together, constitute the average person, the inquiry reduces to
whether the average person would take the precaution if he or she
bore both the costs and benefits in full. We might call this heuristic,
in which the potential victim and the defendant are the same person,
the "single owner" version of the reasonable person standard.69
The single owner version of the standard takes care of the economic problem
of externalities. An actor will take account of the costs its activities imposes
upon others because, under the standard, those costs are treated as if they were
costs the activity imposed upon the actor herself.
However, if we examine the single owner version of the standard from
outside the legal, economical context in which Gilles uses the term we notice
something rather remarkable. The single owner heuristic, while still focusing
on costs and benefits is a sort of economic Golden Rule. It says: economi-
cally speaking, treat your neighbor as you would treat yourself. Only impose
those costs on someone else that you would impose upon yourself. The single
owner heuristic provides that an actor must value the costs its action imposes
upon another the same as it would value those same burdens if imposed upon
itself. While Professor Bender might still object to the emphasis on costs and
benefits, the single owner heuristic caries within itself the capacity to contem-
plate economically compassionate behavior. Moreover, for present purposes,
the single owner heuristic allows the decision maker to consider the case from
both the plaintiffs perspective and the defendant's perspective. In an ironic
twist, the single owner heuristic collapses the difference between the plaintiff
and the defendant. As such, it encourages the decision maker, at least the
economic decision maker, to bridge the gap that separates the plaintiff and the
defendant, i.e., to analyze the case finally as if one person caused the injury to
herself and then to ask if such personal injury (literally) would be efficient.
Another wayto ask the question is to ask whether the imposition of the injury
upon one's self would be tolerable.7" The single owner heuristic bridges the
gap of separateness that would otherwise exist between plaintiff and defen-
dant.
By way of summary, the reasonable person standard manifests the
flexibility inherent in negligence "law." It allows the jury, whether infused
with economic principles or not, to make fact specific determinations concern-
69 Gilles, supra note 36, at 1035.
70 The reader will note that the single owner heuristic shatters the common law's
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Professor Bender would also ignore that
traditional distinction. Bender, supra note 60, at 33-36.
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ing what is or what is not reasonable care under the circumstances. As such,
the reasonable person standard allows negligence law to blossom and respond
to both differing situations and to the compelling concerns of the community.
Moreover, the reasonable person standard allows the jury to bring its common
sense compassion to bear upon the facts of the particular case. While some
may perceive the standard's vague open-endedness as a deficit, rather than a
strength, it remains that the reasonable person standard is one of the reasons
why negligence, as we know it, defies the precise articulation we see, or think
we see, in some other areas of the law. However, the reasonable person
standard is not the only place where the flexibility inherent in negligence and
tort manifests itself. Proximate cause and duty/risk, have, over the years,
been almost as defiant as the reasonable person standard in their steadfast
refusal to be reduced to a series of succinct rules.
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND DUTY/RISK:
FLEXIBLE POLICY MAKING
Perhaps no area of law plagues the logical powers of law students and
lawyers more than proximate cause in negligence cases. One of proximate
cause's most perplexing points is its overlap with or relationship to the duty
element of negligence, supposedly a separate element. Doctrinally, duty and
proximate cause are kept separate in the traditional approach to negligence.
That is, the defendant must have a duty toward the plaintiff not to engage in
the particular conduct involved and the defendant's breach of that duty must
be the proximate (or legal) cause of the plaintiff's injuries." However, one of
the great breakthroughs of legal scholarship in the earlier twentieth century,
spearheaded by Dean Leon Green and Professor Wex Malone, was that duty
and proximate cause were, in essence, two aspects of the same basic
question.7 2 We might call that basic question the duty/risk question. 73 That
basic question in a negligence case is whether this plaintiff should recover
from this defendant for these injuries which arose in this manner.74 To answer
that question Green and Malone collapsed the duty and proximate cause
questions into one basic inquity did the defendant owe a duty to this plaintiff
to protect against this risk which arose in this manner in this case? In
collapsing those elements, duty/risk expressly recognizes the authority of the
court, in a particular case, to articulate the scope of the relevant duty. Green
"' KEETON, ET AL., supra note 14, § 30 at 164-68.
72 See generally, LEON GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 39-40, 76-77
(1927); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 73 (1956).
73 See Galligan, supra note 15, at 36.
74See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 15; Galligan, supra note 48, at 1509; William R. Crowe,
Anatomy of a Tort, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 903 (1976).
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emphasized that the court answered the duty/risk question as a matter of
law.7" It was a question for the court, not for the jury.76 The paradigm
opinion applying the duty/risk method of analysis is Justice Cardozo's
opinion for a majority of the court in Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad." In
Palsgraf, Cardozo held that the Long Island Railroad owed no duty to Helen
Palsgraf to protect her from the risk of being hit in the head by falling scales
which toppled when railroad employees pushed a boarding passenger from
behind causing him to drop a bundle containing fireworks which ignited and,
in turn, caused the scales to fall on Mrs. Palsgraf's head.
The duty/risk method of analysis expressly recognized and articulated
the judges' supposed law making power in a negligence action. As such, it
revealed to judges, lawyers, and legal scholars that the issue of proximate
cause, under the traditional approach, was really a question of policy.
Proximate cause was really a question of whether this plaintiff ought to
recover from this defendant in this particular case as a matter of policy. Thus,
the word "cause" in proximate cause is a metaphor for a societal balancing
process. Cause, in proximate cause, is not related to philosophical concep-
tions of cause at all. Instead, it relates to a socially specific decision regarding
the liability of the particular defendant before the court to the particular
plaintiff before the court for the particular injuries before the court. Thus, as
the first year law students sees, usually on the eve of his or her torts final,
proximate cause is really a policy question, not a cause question at all.
Despite the persuasive force of the works of Green, Malone, and their
followers, many jurisdictions still adhere to the traditional approach to
negligence, leaving the policy loaded question of proximate cause to the jury.
Perhaps this is inevitable; perhaps it is even desirable. My goal here is not to
proselytize on behalf of one approach or the other. My goal here is to
examine both approaches and to reveal how each in practice is consistent with
my storytelling model of torts. I aim to show how each approach is so general
and responsive to the details of the case that either approach yields a fact-
specific, detail responsive, non-prescriptive result. Let me begin with
proximate cause.
Under the traditional negligence approach, proximate cause is a question
for the jury. The judge instructs the jury that in order to hold the defendant
liable it must find that the defendant breached the appropriate standard of care
of the reasonable person under the circumstances (what I discussed above)
and that the defendant's breach of that standard was a cause-in-fact and a
proximate (or legal) cause of the plaintiff's injuries.7" The court instructs the
75 Green, supra note 72, at 4.
7
6Id.
- 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
78 Some courts jumble cause-in-fact and proximate cause together. Herein I focus on the
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jury that a proximate cause is a cause which, "in a natural and continuous
sequence, produces damage.. ."" Or, the judge tells the jury that one proxi-
mately causes those damages which directly result from his or her negligent
conduct, or, a judge might tell the jury that one proximately causes those
damages which might foreseeably arise from his or her conduct."0 What the
judge means by foresight depends upon his or her lexicon of legal terms.
Some courts use the term foresight to truly mean foresight, i.e. what was
foreseeable beforehand."' Other courts, and even the Restatement (Second),
use the term, at least under certain circumstances, to mean hindsight.8 2
Moreover, it is at the proximate cause stage that the jury must decide whether
or not any number of possible intervening causes rise to the level of supersed-
ing causes.83 If an intervening cause rises to the level of a superseding cause
then the original defendant is relieved of liability. 4 Concomitantly, if the
intervening cause does not supersede then the intervening cause does not
break the metaphorical chain of causation and the jury is still free to find the
defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.8"
In short, the "law" of proximate cause, given to the jury in the form of a
jury instruction, is comical. There is, in essence, little or no, guidance at all.
The jury is given a broad range of buzz words which have little or no real
predictive power at all. The jury is asked to decide, in light of those buzz
words, whether the defendant ought to be held responsible for the plaintiff's
injuries. The jury is really asked to decide the policy issue at the heart of the
particular case before it in light of a series of words which have virtually no
logical, determinative effect. One who takes doctrine seriously is tempted to
throw up his or her hands at this point and simply walk away from negligence
law altogether. The more optimistic among us who recall Green and Malone's
teachings that proximate cause is largely a question of policy may still end up
shaking our heads in disbelief when a jury is asked to decide such important
matters of policy.
Whatever prescription one may come up with for a legal system so
devoid of rules, the point is that the jury, when deciding the proximate or legal
proximate cause element, not cause-in-fact.
79 ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AMI 501 (1974).
80 TExAs PATTERN JURY CHARGE, § 203.
81 See, e.g., Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Oversees
Tankship (U.K.) L. v. B. Mort's Dock & Eng'g Co., L. (Wagonmound N.O. 1), [Privy 1961]
A.C. 388 (Privy Counsel).
82 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, (1928)
(Andrews J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (2D) OF TORTS § 443, cmt. b (1965).
83 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 44 at 301-19.




cause issue, is free to apply its sense of justice to the particular case before it.
By entrusting the jury with the power to set the limits of the defendant's duty
in the particular case as a matter of fact/law the court is essentially abdicating
its decisionmaking power in the particular case. In this vein, the law of
proximate cause is not dissimilar from the standard of care that I have
discussed above. The standard of care is sufficiently vague and general to
allow the jury to determine negligence cases on a case-by-case basis. It is
general enough to allow the jury to make decisions regarding the appropriate
standard of care in light of their sense of fairness or justice. It is broad
enough to allow thejuryto consider the detail of the particular stories they are
asked to consider and to render a decision in light of those stories.
The same is true with proximate cause. The lack of rules surrounding
proximate cause, in most cases, allows the jury, or judge as factfinder, to
consider the case in light of the particular details of the narratives presented
to it by the respective parties and ultimately to render a promixate cause
decision in light of how those detailed stories strike them. That is, in most
garden variety tort cases, where the factfinder decides proximate cause, the
detail of the facts of the particular case, rather than some more generally
applicable legal rule, becomes the focus of the jury's application of its sense
of justice to the case before it.
Thus, in jurisdictions where juries, or judges, as factfinders, decide
proximate cause as a mixed question of law and fact they are relatively
unconstrained by doctrine in deciding the particular cases before them.
Likewise, the parties are free to present their versions (stories) within a broad
spectrum of dramatic possibility. The lack of rules on this critical point
allows the creative lawyer room within which to work. Proximate cause is a
blank easel on which to paint. Proximate cause "law" encourages the parties
to present detailed, emotionally evocative productions of their view of the
case.
Now, let us consider whether a jurisdiction which has adopted Green and
Malone's duty/risk approach manifests a more analytical, logical pattern. As
noted, the duty/risk approach collapses the duty and proximate cause into one
question. That one question is whether or not the defendant's duty extends to
protect the particular plaintiff from the particular risk which arose in the
particular manner before the court. This question may be viewed as a
question of law. Leon Green thought the duty/risk question was an issue of
law for the court to decide.8 6 In deciding this legal issue the court supposedly
considers the case in light of the relevant policies of tort law such as deter-
rence, compensation, risk spreading, punishment, administrative convenience,
consistency with prior decisions and legislative enactments, and morality, i.e.
86See GREEN, supra note 72, at 4.
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the community's sense of fairness or justice.8 7 One of the supposed benefits
of the duty/risk approach is its evocation of a judicial discussion of the
particular case in light of the relevant policies of tort law. Several points bear
emphasis here: (1) the specificity with which the court asks the duty/risk
question and the effect of that specificity on the development of doctrine and
tort law, (2) the courts' persistent failure to express the analysis the duty/risk
method supposedly evokes, and, finally, (3) the inevitable slippage, even in a
duty/risk jurisdiction, back towards a proximate cause approach.
Let me begin with specificity. According to Green, the duty/risk ques-
tion was a question of law for the court to answer before it submitted the issue
of the defendant's compliance or non- compliance with the standard of care to
the jury.88 The court had the power, in any case, to ask the duty/risk question
in an extremely fact specific manner. One of the most off-cited of all
duty/risk cases is the Louisiana Supreme Court's 1972 opinion in Hill v.
Lundin & Associates.89 Hill is a case specific application of the duty/risk
method.
After Hurricane Betsy, New Orleans was in shambles and home owners
began the repair effort. Lundin & Associates, Inc. was a contractor engaged
in the campaign to repair the city. Mrs. Rosemary Delouise had suffered
damage to her home in the hurricane and she hired Lundin to do repair work.
Lundin apparently had quite a few jobs going on at the time. In order to
operate efficiently, given the need to get repairs done quickly to avoid further
damage and the shortage of labor and materials, Lundin delivered both
material and equipment to each job site by truck. Later, repair people arrived,
did the work, and left. Thereafter still, workers would come and pick up the
equipment and left over materials. Presumably this process freed up the
repair persons to get on to their next job without having to worry about "clean
up." Lundin's operation was a veritable assembly line of residential repair
with each link in the chain doing its job and its job only.
In any event, after repairing the Delouise home, Lundin's people left a
metal ladder on the job site, a ladder leaning up against the Delouise home.
Later, some unknown person took the ladder down from the house and laid it
in the yard. Thereafter, the phantom ladder mover walked back into the fog
of post-hurricane New Orleans, never to be heard from again.
A few days after the construction work, Mrs. Delouise's employee, Mrs.
Hill, went out to the yard to hang up some wash. The ladder was lying in the
yard when Mrs. Hill went to hang up the laundry. Mrs. Hill knew the ladder
was there; indeed she stepped over the ladder to get to the clothes line. While
Hill was in the yard, her charge, the youngest Delouise child, about 2 or 3
87 Crow, supra note 74.
88 Green, supra note 72, at 4.
89 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
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years old at the time, came running out, looking for Mrs. Hill. When Hill
heard the back door slam, she looked up to see the youngster running toward
her. Instinctively, Hill hurried in the child's direction to prevent him from
falling over the ladder. Alas, the trap from which Mrs. Hill sought to save the
child proved to be her own downfall - literally. Hill fell over the ladder
herself and suffered injuries in the process: an incisional hernia and an acute
lumbosacral strain.9"
Most critically for present purposes, Mrs. Hill sued Lundin, claiming it
had been negligent to leave the ladder leaning up against the side of the house.
Somehow or other this garden variety tort case made it all the way to the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The case is of critical importance both in the
development of Louisiana negligence law and in the national history of the
duty/risk approach because it is one of the first cases in which a state's high
court expressly employed the duty/risk negligence approach in a plain old tort
case (one not involving the violation of a criminal statute).91 Moreover, Hill
is one of the most pristine examples of a high court's use of the duty/risk
analysis to decide a negligence case. In an opinion by Justice Barham, the
Louisiana Supreme Court first briefly described the duty/risk method of
analysis. The court noted:
It is only that conduct which creates an appreciable range of risks for
causing harm that is prohibited. Leaving a ladder unattended under
certain circumstances may create an unreasonable risk of harm to
others which would impose a reciprocal duty upon the actor. If we
assume that the defendant was under a duty not to leave the ladder
leaning against the house because of an unreasonable risk of harm,
the breach of that duty would not necessarily give rise to liability in
this case.9
2
Thus, the court said that even if leaving a ladder up against the side of
the house may be careless (negligent) it would not necessarily protect every
claimant from every risk which may transpire as a result of the ladder being
left up against the side of the house. The court then asked the basic duty/risk
question in light of the particular facts of the case, devoid of any reference to
proximate cause buzz words like direct, intervening, or superseding:
The basic question then, is whether the risk of injury from a ladder
laying on the ground, produced by a combination of the defendant's
901 have essentially quoted the facts from one of my previous works. Galligan, supra
note 15, at 32-33.
911Id. at 1.
92 256 So. 2d at 622.
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act and that of a third party, is within the scope of protection of a
rule of law which would prohibit leaving a ladder leaning against the
house.
93
Then, after various general statements, the court answered its own duty/risk
question stating:
A rule of law which would impose a duty upon one not to leave a
ladder standing against a house does not encompass the risk here
encountered. We are of the opinion that the defendant is under no
duty to protect this plaintiff from the risk which gave rise to her
injuries. The plaintiff has failed to establish legal and actionable
negligence on the part of the defendant.94
Consequently, the court concluded the defendant's duty (if there was one) not
to leave the ladder leaning up against the side of the house did not include the
risk that Mrs. Hill would be injured when she fell over the ladder because
some third person moved it. As such, due to its conclusion of law in answer-
ing the duty/risk question, there was no issue of the appropriate standard of
care to be decided by the trier of fact.95
The specificity with which the court asked the duty/risk question in Hill
resulted in a legal decision that the particular defendant's (Lundin) duty did
not include the risk that the particular plaintiff (Hill) would be injured in the
particular manner in which she was injured. The decision resulted in a fact
specific no duty rule. The fact specific no duty rule must be contrasted with
more general no duty rules such as the economic harm rule,96 the general no
duty to act rule,97 the traditional rule that one may not recover for negligently
inflicted emotional distress,9 and more99 which will be discussed below. In
Hill, we have a no duty rule based upon the particular facts of the case. Note
that the factfinder played no role in deciding the scope of that duty (i.e.
proximate cause). The court decided the scope of the duty as a matter of law.
But is the fact specific no duty rule really so different than a fact specific
decision by a jury (or judge as factfinder) that Lundin did not proximately or
93 Id.
94 Id. at 623.
9 In fact, Hill was a bench trial so if the court had decided the defendant had a duty not
to leave a ladder lying against a house and that that duty included the risk which occurred in the
case it would have had to decide the question of breach.
96 LAYCOCK, supra note 21, at 116-18.
97 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 56 at 373-75.
9 Id. at § 54.
99 See infra Section V.
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legally cause the plaintiff's injuries? I would argue it is not Consider, just
how many cases there are which a lower court will be able to decide as a
matter of law based on the rule of law articulated in Hill? I think the answer
is none. The specificity with which the court decided the duty issue effectively
precluded its use as a future predictive tool. There will not be other cases
exactly like Hill. In deciding the scope of the duty in future cases a court
employing the law-stating power which the duty/risk approach gives it will
have to issue a new case specific rule. In essence then, the case specific
application of the duty/risk approach does nothing to the traditional proximate
cause approach except to transfer decision making power to the judge.
The proximate cause approach results in case specific, policy decisions
concerning the scope of duty (or liability) too but with proximate cause the
factfinder decides. The only difference between the case specific duty/risk
approach and the traditional approach is who decides. Under the proximate
cause approach, the factfinder decides the case in light of the particular
presentations of the parties whereas under the Hill approach the judge decides
the scope of the duty, but, that judge's decision is just as much a case specific
decision as the juries decision as proximate cause."' Moreover, both judge
(duty/risk) and jury (proximate cause) are allowed to listen to the risk detailed
stories the parties present. Under either duty/risk or proximate cause the
parties have great flexibility in how they present their cases. Under either
approach, the relevant decision maker, whether factfmder or law maker, issues
a specific decision for the case with little or no precedential value. Neither
decision, as the following paragraphs reveal is particularly logical. And, as
such, both defy doctrine.
The second point concerning the duty/risk approach and the subject of
this paper revolves around the supposedly evocative nature of the duty/risk
approach. I borrow the word "evocative" from Professor David Robertson of
the University of Texas.101 Duty/risk supposedly evokes a discussion of the
court's analysis, i.e. it evokes reasoned elaboration. However, I am struck,
after reading scores of duty risk cases in Louisiana, the jurisdiction which I
am most familiar, that our supposedly evocative duty/risk approach often
evokes little or no actual policy discussion. I should rephrase and say that I
am not sure the able Louisiana judges analyze and discuss "policy" any more
often than judges deciding tort cases in other jurisdictions.
10 In essence, the judge's decision of the scope of the duty in a case like Hill is akin to
Holmes' statement that negligence cases, over time, ought to be decided according to rules of
law. See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw, 98-99 (Baltimore 1881).
However, Holmes' rules of law related to the applicable standard of care and thus, technically,
the issue of breach. Here, in a case like Hill, the issue related to the scope of duty or what the
traditional approach calls proximate cause.
"I See, David W. Robertson, Reason v. Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill
v. Lundin & Assoc., Inc., 34 LA. L. RFv. 1 (1973).
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Supposedly, as I understand duty/risk, it is designed to encourage judges
to apply the particular policies of tort law to the particular cases they consider
and to explain that application. Duty/risk supposedly evokes a policy
discussion of the facts of the particular case being decided. But, let's look
back at Hill.
In Hill, the court simply said there was liffle or no "ease of associa-
tion""0 2 between a rule of law which would say that one should not leave a
ladder leaning up against the side of a house and the result which happened in
the case.'0 3 One is struck by the number of duty/risk cases which, while
alluding to policy, simply draw a conclusion that the defendant's duty either
does or does not include the risk which manifested itself to the particular
plaintiff in the particular case. 104 Robertson, while using the word "evoca-
tive," in reference to duty/risk, has, in fact, recognized the courts' persistent
inability to articulate the basis, if any for their analysis (if there is any). He
has stated, in reference to Hill:
Maybe it is just a matter of tradition. Courts do not talk that way, it
is just not done. But, really, you must realize often there is not very
much sensibly to be said about the ultimate reason for a particular
result-that it just seems more fair than the opposite outcome may
be about all there is to it.10 5
So, courts just do not talk about policies. Well, duty/risk is supposed to
get them to talk about policy so perhaps the failure to talk about policy is a
failure of duty/risk. Or, perhaps, as Robertson so aptly suggests, the results
in particular cases are not driven so much by the policies of tort law, which we
scholars so rationally and logically apply to broad classes of cases, but rather
results in particular cases are driven by what seems fair to the particular
decision maker, i.e., judge or jury. The articulation of why a particular result
seems more fair than the opposite result is not possible. It is not a purely
rational decision. It is as much a visceral or emotional decision as it is the
result of reasoned analysis. Likewise, one's perception of fairness may vary
02 256 So. 2d at 622.
103 Louisiana courts have relied upon the phrase "ease of association" in deciding
duty/riskcases sincefHill. See, e.g., Roberts v. Benoit, 586 So. 2d 131 (La. 1990). The phrase
is surely not a substitute for more traditional legal analysis. In fact, one might reasonably
conclude ease of association is, in essence, merely another buzz word/phrase like "direct",
"foreseeable", "natural," "remote."
" Happily, there are Louisiana decisions which particularly analyze the policies of tort
law in light of the duty/risk approach thereby fulfilling duty/risk's promise. See, e.g., Fowler v.
Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1 (La. 1990); Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La.
1988); Turner v. NOPSI, 476 So. 2d 800 (La. 1985) (Dennis, J., concurring).
105 Robertson, supra note 101, at 12.
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with the facts and details of the particular cases. Perhaps then, we see one of
the reasons why the traditional approach to negligence hides behind the buzz
words of proximate cause. It hides behind those words because those buzz
words are essentially broad metaphors for fairness. The words open out to
allow the factfinder to apply its perception of fairness to the facts of the
particular case.
Robertson's insights lead to another useful point. Perhaps, some of the
policies of tort law are susceptible to reasoned analysis and application in real
cases. These would seem to include deterrence, risk spreading, and adminis-
trative convenience. In our modem age deterrence becomes synonymous with
the economic approach to negligence law, as exemplified by the Learned Hand
Formula."° One might decide judges are better trained than juries to deal with
economic analysis. Moreover, risk spreading may also be an area where
judges are better able to evenhandedly analyze the effects of potential results
than juries which may be overinfluenced by pure redistributional concerns.
Additionally, a jury may not be particularly apt at gauging the potential effects
of its decision on the administration ofjustice. A particular jury may not be
able to understand the potential for future suits of a decision holding the
defendant liable to the plaintiff. That is, the jury may not be able to under-
stand the practical difficulty of allowing recovery in a class of cases. Alterna-
tively, where a statute is involved and a plaintiff attempts to use the statute to
establish the appropriate standard of care for the particular case, 107 questions
of legislative interpretation are involved.' Courts trained to interpret
statutes would seem to have an advantage over juries here as well.
However, recognizing that courts may be more adept than juries at
articulating and applying certain of the policies of tort law does not mean that
a court is superior to a group of lay people in deciding what result in a
particular case is the most fair. One of the basic strengths of the jury, as a
decision maker, is its ability to bring the common sense of the community to
bear on the facts of the particular case. One may wonder whether or not,
where the determinative issue is one's gut sense of fairness, judges or juries
ought to be making that decision.
'0" See United States v. Caroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
1o See KEETON, Er AL., supra note 14, § 36 at 220.
11 In violation of statute cases, the court must decide whether or not the plaintiff is within
the class of plaintiffs sought to be protected by the statute and whether or not the risk is within
the class of risks which the legislature enacted the statute to guard against. See, e.g., Stach-
niewicz v. Mar-Can Corp., 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436 (1971). Facially, resolving these
questions is an issue of legislative intent. However, legislative intent is often lacking and is
always subject to manipulation. Thus, courts and commentators have recognized that the
interpretation of legislative intent is as much a matter ofjudicial policy making as it is legislative
policy making. See, e.g., Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., 256 So. 2d 620, 621 (La. 1972).
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It is precisely because juries in particular cases may be the preferred
body for deciding the scope of the defendant's duty that there is an inevitable
slippage even in a so called duty/risk jurisdiction back to the proximate cause
approach. Some may decry the slippage; however, it seems inevitable.10 9 It
is inevitable that parties will prevail upon the judge, or the judge will inde-
pendently decide, to entrust the fairness question to the jury."0
Thus, if the scope of the risk question in a particular case involves
essentially a question of basic fairness one might conclude courts would like
to have the power to ask the jury to make that decision. One way to get the
jury to make that decision is to address a part of the scope of the duty issue to
thejury. In a duty/risk jurisdiction the court could do so by either instructing
the jury to make part of the duty/risk determination or it could instruct the jury
to decide whether or not the plaintiff's injuries were proximately or legally
caused by the defendant. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has authorized
such a legal cause approach in at least some cases."' Thus, in Louisiana, one
duty/risk jurisdiction, there has been a slippage back to the proximate cause
analysis, at least in certain cases.
Consequently, one sees that proximate cause, duty/risk, and the standard
of care all allow some decision maker, whether judge or jury, to apply its
broad sense of fairness to the particular facts of the particular case. Whether
we are talking about a breach of the appropriate standard of care, duty/risk
decided by the court, or proximate cause decided by the jury we are talking
about areas where doctrine, legal rules, do not prevail. Dogma does not
decide these cases. Rather, the jury or judge looks at the facts of the particular
case before it and, by applying general, metaphorical, concepts to the particu-
lar facts, the relevant decision maker decides the particular case. The relevant
decision maker listens to the plaintiff's story and the defendant's story and
ultimately writes its own story, or at least writes its own ending to the story.
109 See, e.g., Bobby M. Harges, The Rebirth of Proximate Cause in Louisiana: A Call
for the Return to Duty RiskAnalysis, 39 Loy. L. Rev. 769 (1994).
" Revealingly, even in a case where the plaintiff asks the court to adopt a statute as the
standard of care of the reasonable person there is an inevitable tendency for a jury to end up
involved in deciding the scope of the duty. This can effectively happen in one of two ways.
Sometimes it happens overtly because the court, even though it has decided to adopt the statute,
still asks the jury to decide whether or not the violation of the statute legally causes the plaintiffs
damages. In other cases, the jury effectively gets to decide the scope of the duty because the
procedural effect of violation of statute is either some evidence of negligence or a rebuttable
presumption of negligence thus shifting the burden to the defendant to prove it was not
negligent. In these cases, the jury is free to establish its own standard of care and in doing so,
in essence, to decide not only the standard of care but also the scope of the duty under the guise
of applying the standard of care. Of course, the jury may do the same thing in any negligence
case by effectively merging the standard of care/legal cause decision into one basic fairness
question.
.. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
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The particularized, case specific, dogma defying, characteristics of negligence
law manifest themselves not just in the three areas already discussed but also
at the damages stage when the jury is asked to award compensatory damages
and with the allocation of fault under the modem doctrine of comparative
fault.
IV. CONTINUATION OF A COMMON THREAD:
COMPENSATION AND COMPARATIVE FAULT
Compensatory damages are designed to make the plaintiff whole. The
purpose of compensatory damages is to put the plaintiff in the position he or
she would have been in but for the wrong. As Professor Douglas Laycock has
said: the purpose of compensatory damages is to return to the plaintiff to his
or her rightful position. 112 In tort cases compensatory damages generally
include two categories: special damages and general damages. Special
damages are those damages which must be specially pled" 3 and which,
hypothetically at least, are susceptible of some precise determination." 4
These include lost wages, both past and present, and medical expenses, both
past and present.1 General damages are damages awarded for incalculable
injuries such as: pain and suffering, mental anguish, and possible loss of
enjoyment of life. 6 In either case, the award of damages in the particular tort
case is focused not on the class of people of which the plaintiff is a member
or on the general type of injuries which the plaintiff has suffered but rather on
the particular plaintiff involved.
Thus, in awarding special damages, the jury must consider the circum-
stances of the particular plaintiff. If the particular plaintiff has medical
expenses which the reasonable plaintiff would not have incurred those
expenses might be still recoverable. Moreover, in awarding lost wages or lost
earning capacity, the factfinder considers the losses suffered by the particular
plaintiff not the losses that the average wage earner would suffer.
One sees the same specificity when the avoidable consequences doctrine
is involved. The avoidable consequences, or mitigation of damages, doctrine
provides that the plaintiff, after suffering injury, must act reasonably to
mitigate the affects of the injury.I 7 However, if for some particular reason,
the plaintiff reasonably cannot take certain steps to avoid damages his or her
112 LAYcocK, supra note 21, at 15.
113 DOBBS, supra note 13, § 34 at 234.




7 DOBBS, supra note 13, § 39 at 27.
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award will not necessarily be reduced."' Thus, the obese plaintiff who is not
able to exercise may suffer greater damages than the thin plaintiff whose
exercise regimen can mitigate the effects of his or her personal injury." 9
These additional damages wil be recoverable. The impecunious plaintiff who
cannot afford certain damage abatement measures will still be entitled to
recover damages which a more financially well healed plaintiff might have
been able to avoid by a relatively small investment.'20 Or, if the right invaded
in the particular case would be eviscerated by requiring mitigation, the
plaintiff may have no duty to mitigate. 2'
Turning to general damages, we see perhaps the most dramatic example
of tailoring damage awards to the needs of the particular plaintiff. Juries
rendering awards for mental anguish, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoy-
ment of life focus not on the average person but once again, on the particular
plaintiff. Unlike worker's compensation cases where the loss of a hand (the
loss of a leg, the loss of an eye, etc.) has some scheduled "value," in tort cases
factfmders consider the details of the particular case. Fact finders consider
the pain the particular plaintiff suffered, the mental anguish this plaintiff has
suffered, and the loss of enjoyment of life this plaintiff has suffered. 22 The
jury focuses in on the particular plaintiff involved in the particular case. It
should be noted that recent proposals to provide jurors with guidelines or
schedules'23 for general damages are inconsistent with traditional rules
concerning general damages. The proposals would abstract away from the
particular plaintiff. While some of these proposals would not bind the jury to
award scheduled amounts, the guidelines would inevitably tend to encourage
juries to consider and perhaps to focus on the average case rather than the
particular case. While this may not be an undesirable trend, it would be
inconsistent with the traditional approach to general damages.
Jurisprudence involving the loss of enjoyment of life manifests a similar
concern for the individual plaintiff. When the plaintiff sues for the loss of
enjoyment of life she claims she does not get the same enjoyment out of life
she obtained prior to the injury. However, several cases have held that
comatose plaintiffs because they are unaware of their condition, are not able
to recover for either pain and suffering, or for loss of enjoyment of life.' 24
,Id. at 273.
"'Close v. State, 456 N.Y.S. 2d 437 (App. Div. 1982).
'
20Persinger v. Lucas, 512 N.E. 2d 865 (Ind. App. 1987).
,21 O'Brien v. Isaacs, 17 Wis. 2d 261, 116 N.W. 2d 246 (1962).
See generally, LAYCOCK, supra note 21, at 144-90.
123 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONALINJURY, 219-220 (1990); Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein, Valuing Life and Lemon
Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 N.W.U.L. REv. 908 (1988).
24See, e.g., McDougald v. Garter, 73 N.Y. 2d 246, 536 N.E. 2d 372 (1989).
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Once again, these decisions are consistent with traditional rules focusing on
the particular situation of each plaintiff. They are consistent because rather
than adopting a deterrence oriented perspective which would seem to sanction
recovery despite lack of awareness juries are not allowed to award loss of
enjoyment of life unless the particular plaintiff suffers the injury. Thus,
according to these courts, since the unaware plaintiff does not suffer the
injury, recovery is not warranted.
Finally, on the subject of compensatory damages one should note the
Thin Skull Rule which is, in fact, a duty or proximate cause rule. 2 However,
its most direct effect is on the recovery of damages. The Thin Skull Rule
provides, consistent with all of what has been said so far in this section, that
the defendant takes the plaintiff as he or she finds him or her. 126 Thus, the
plaintiff with a Thin Skull is entitled to recover all damages he or she suffers,
not just those damages which the defendant's misconduct would have caused
the average reasonable person. 2' This allows full compensation for the Thin
Skull plaintiff. The rule requires the jury to focus in on the precise details,
both physical'28 and mental" 9 of the particular plaintiff before the court. It
forces the jury to consider the injury of the particular Thin Skull plaintiff.
All of these plaintiff specific damage'3 ° rules require a personalized,
detailed consideration of the particular plaintiffs plight. They rely on the
factfinder's response to the individualized plight for content. Rules recede
from view, while detail occupies center stage.
A further indication of tort's tendency to focus on the details of the
particular case manifests itself in the modem doctrine of comparative fault.
Formerly, in most jurisdictions, the plaintiff s contributory negligence was a
bar to recovery. A plaintiff, even if injured, would not recover compensatory
damages if the defendant established that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent.' In most cases, once the courts found the plaintiff was negligent,




11 Id. See also, Steinhouser v. Hartz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970).
"I While I have limited my discussion here to compensatory damages, one could also
view punitive awards as case specific punishment As recent debate on the subject reveals,
standards governing the availability and amount of punitive awards are typical of other tort
standards in their generality.
13 Of course, there were exceptions such as the doctrine of last clear chance. See, e.g.,
Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). Likewise, courts in several states held that in
certain circumstances the defendant's duty included the risk of the plaintiff's own negligence.
Thus, the defendant essentially had a duty to protect the plaintiff from his or her own negli-
gence and the contributorily negligent plaintiff recovered despite his or her fault. See, e.g.,
Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1979). Additionally, courts facing sympathetic
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the result was no recovery."' Thus, a finding of plaintiff fault'33 short-
circuited the need for a case specific comparison of the fault of the defendant
and the fault of the plaintiff. With the advent of comparative fault that
specific comparison must now be made in most cases where both parties are
at fault. 34
Now, when both the plaintiff and defendant are negligent the factfinder
attributes fault to the plaintiff and to the defendant and then, in a pure
comparative fault regime, the plaintiff recovers its damages, reduced by his or
her own percentage of fault. 35 Even in a jurisdiction with a modified compar-
ative fault regime, the court must quantify the respective fault of the plaintiff
and defendant to determine whether plaintiffs recovery will be reduced or
barred (if plaintiffs fault is greater than some specified percentage). 136 In
essence, comparative fault allows the factfinder to consider the detailed
allegations of fault against both parties and to compare the respective fault of
the parties on a case specific basis to arrive at a decision which is reasonable,
be it 50/50, 80/20, 73/27, or 19/81. In short, comparative fault allows the
jury to divide responsibility in the particular case amongst the parties in any
reasonable manner. The only limit the law imposes is that the allocated
portions of fault total 100%.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act counsels that, in allocating fault, a
factfinder should consider (1) the causal relationship between the respective
actors' conduct and the plaintiff's injuries and (2) various factors relating to
the blameworthiness of the respective parties. 37 Essentially, the factfinder
deciding a comparative fault case, like the factfinder setting the appropriate
standard of care and the factfinder deciding the proximate cause, follows only
the roughest of doctrinal outlines in rendering its case specific decision. The
same is true of the parties as they prepare their cases.
To reiterate, the parties in a negligence action argue their cases in
concrete, fact specific detail. Broad standards provide decision makers with
unparalleled flexibility in rendering decisions in particular cases, when
confronted with at least two detailed, personally poignant versions of the facts
giving rise to the law suit. The trial becomes a societal drama where the
plaintiffs developed special rules concerning the standard of care for certain plaintiffs, such as
the physically challenged and children. These specific standards of care are now frequently
applicable in cases where a relevant actor is either the plaintiff or defendant. KEETON, ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 32 at 175-82.
132 Cf. note 130 supra.
133 Even then there was a case specific, detailed consideration of plaintiff's fault.
134 See generally VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATivE NEGLIGENCE (1974).
13S ee, e.g., KEroN ET AL., supra note 14, § 67 at 471 n. 28 and 472 n. 31.
136 Id. at 473-74.
137 UNIFORM COMPARATIvE FAULT ACT § 2.
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decision makers play the part of both audience and adjudicator. The breadth
of the relevant grounds for decision makes tort litigation both relatively
unpredictable and particularly responsive to the broad range of personal injury
plots produced by our technological society.
However, I would not be presenting an accurate picture of the universe
of personal injury litigation ifI pretended there were no rules at all. There are,
in fact, constellations of cases which have clustered around what the lawyer
regards as a traditional rule. I will deal with some of these legal rules, both
past and present, in the next section.
V. TORT RULES:
CENSORING THE DRAMA OF PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION
As I noted in the last paragraph lest I leave the reader with the impres-
sion that all tort cases are decided without the benefit of any rules at all, in
this section I pause to note and discuss some actual rules. Traditionally, most
of these rules are broad rules preventing recovery. Put differently, they are
what Professor David Leonard has calls "per se no duty rules."13 Tradition-
ally, courts recognized broad categories of cases where, despite the foresee-
ability of injury arising from the defendant's conduct, despite the defendants
unreasonable conduct, and despite the plaintiffs actual injury as a result of
the defendant's conduct, plaintiffs were not allowed to recover from defen-
dants. Many of us recognize these cases under the rubric of Prosser, Wade &
Schwartz's "Limited Duty" Rules. 139 For instance, traditionally a plaintiff
who suffered only emotional distress could not recovery in negligence from
the defendant. 4 The courts worried that allowing recovery would: (1) lead
to fraudulent claims and (2) open the flood gates of litigation to a whole class
of claims (3) which courts were not particularly well suited to resolve because
no one could ever be sure what really caused the plaintiffs emotional distress,
either the defendant's misconduct or some pre-existing condition. Conse-
quently, rather than consider the details of the particular case, the court
refused recovery by raising the level of abstraction and denying a class (rather
than an individual) recovery. Interestingly, however, if there was some impact
with the plaintiffs person,' or if the plaintiff manifested some physical
i' 142injury recovery for emotional distress was allowed. Other courts allowed
B'D. Leonard, The Good Samaritan Rule as a Procedural Control Device: Is it Worth
Saving?, 19 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 807, 829 (1986).
139 See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, Ch.
VIII at 390 (8th ed. 1988).
140 KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 54 at 59-67.
14 1 Id. at 363.
142 Id. at 362-64.
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the case to proceed if the plaintiff was in the "zone of danger."'' 3 Thus,
impact, physical manifestation, physical injury, and/or presence in the danger
zone triggered a duty, thereby allowing the parties to tell their stories.
Another per se no duty rule provided that a defendant who caused purely
economic loss was not liable in negligence to the plaintiff.144 Here tort law
deferred to contract law, coupled with a concern for opening the flood gates of
litigation. However, if the plaintiff suffered any property damage or any
personal injury economic loss would also be recoverable. 45 Thus, again a
duty trigger (some "real" injury) allowed the parties to tell their peculiar
narrative tales.
The common law also refused to allow a remote party to recover in
negligence for personal injury from a manufacturer, or repair person, with
whom it had no privity of contract. 46 Here courts slowly developed duty
triggers involving dangerous products1 47 before they shattered the "citadel" of
privity'48 and the detailed narratives of American product liability were born.
The common law still provides that unless there is a special relationship,
or the assumption of a duty, or the defendant causes the plaintiffs injury, 49
then there is no duty to aid another. 5 This rule stems from various philo-
sophical notions of causation as well as a desire to preserve one's liberty not
to help another.'5 ' However, in this area multiple duty triggers have devel-
oped, to the point where the rule itself lacks practical content.5 2 As noted,
once a duty is triggered the general no recovery rule barring an entire class of
plaintiffs gives way and the particular plaintiff is allowed to tell her story.
Finally, for present purposes, traditional law did not recognize any right,
either in the parents or in an unborn child to recover injuries caused to the
unborn child. 53 These rules were based on problems regarding the cause of
the child's condition or injury as well as intractable problems in valuing life
" See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2410-11 (1994) (FELA
case).
144 LAYCOcK, supra note 21, at 116-18.
45See, e.g., Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1111-12
(E.D. La. 1993).
' Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
141 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
148 William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
49 See Thomas C. Galligan, Aiding and Altruism: A Mythopsycholegal Analysis, 27 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM, 439,449-60 (1994).
150 Id.
"'Id. at 511-130.
112 Id. at 449-60.
' KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 55 at 367-73.
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with an infliction as opposed to no life at all. 54 Like some of the other no
duty rules listed, no duty rules relating to the unborn have also eroded to allow
precise consideration in particular cases.
All of these no duty rules represent areas in which tort law provided
certainty and predictability through rules. Another area where one tradition-
ally saw some precise rule making in tort law was in the area of immunities.
At common law, there was sovereign immunity, "'55 intrafamily immunity, 1
56
and charitable immunity.57 Like the no duty rules discussed above immuni-
ties protected defendants from liability. The basis of the protection was the
defendant's status. The immune defendant occupied some status which
insulated it from having its particular conduct second guessed by judges and
juries in discrete tort cases. Defendants' status preempted a detailed consider-
ation of the facts of particular cases. But now with the large scale
abrogation 58 of each of these immunities, governmental entities, parents, and
charities are all forced into litigating over the details of their acts and the acts'
effects.
Both the no duty rules and the immunity rules share several things in
common. First, they all resulted in no liability. They protected defendants.
Second, we have seen an erosion of almost all of them. Hard cases have
presented themselves to courts and courts chipped away at what was once a
protective cloak for certain defendants who caused certain categories of
injuries. Third, and most important of all, both the no duty rules and the
immunities resulted in a broad determination, in some large class of cases,
that the defendant was not liable. This no liability determination could be
made without a trial either through a decision that the plaintiff stated no cause
of action or through a decision the defendant was entitled to summary
judgment. It was not necessary for the court to hear the facts of the particular
case. The no liability determination shielded the relevant class of defendants
from having to undergo the case specific litigation process which otherwise
characterizes negligence cases in particular and tort cases in general. That is,
because the defendant caused some type of damage, such as emotional
distress or purely economic loss, or because the defendant failed to act, or
because of who the defendant was (i.e., status), the court decided the case
based on some broad basis which was not unique to the facts before the court.
The court dismissed the case because of the class of injury suffered, the
generic relationship between the parties (no privity), or because of the defen-
dant's status. As noted, these broad no recovery rules short-circuited the
1S4 Id. at 370-71.
151 Id. at 1033.
156 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 398-402.
"I KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 133 at 1069-70.
158 DOBBS, supra note 156, at 398-443.
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normally case specific, detailed, dramatic progression of the tort case. These
broad no recovery rules created some tension between a system where the
parties told their stories and those stories were resolved by the fact-
finder/decisionmaker as a matter of fact/law based on a common sense of
fairness or justice, and a system where liability was denied because of some
broad rule.
As noted, in the 50s and 60s tort law witnessed a general erosion of these
no recovery rules. These rules gave way in specific cases to particular
exceptions;'5 9 in some cases eroding the rule almost entirely (i.e., privity).160
There is more than one explanation for this development. Many who wrote
for the abrogation of certain rules, such as the privity requirement, contended
that manufacturers were generallybetter risk spreaders than the plaintiffs they
injured. 16' The risk spreading, or enterprise liability, justification for ex-
panded dutyrules for manufacturers is, like the no recovery absent privity rule
that it replaced, based on general conceptions regarding the ability of manu-
facturers, in general, to spread risk through access to markets or insurance.
That reason is just as inconsistent as the no duty rule with the dramatic, case
specific role I have mapped for torts. However, the erosion of privity is
consistent with society's preference for having product liability cases decided
on a case-by-case, fact specific basis.
Predictably, with the erosion of broad no duty rules came an assault upon
the vague, doctrinally defiant, generality of tort law. The tort reform move-
ment of the 70s and 80s, in retrospect, was an attempt to return, at least on
some level, to a more rule oriented tort system. For instance, caps on general
damages or caps on recovery in certain trpes of cases now control the tort
factfinder's ability to tailor the damages awarded to the facts of the particular
case. 162 Caps are a limit on the decision maker's ability to achieve a fact
specific compensatory damage award in certain classes of cases. Moreover,
product liability reform, both at the state and national level, has attempted to
limit the scope of a manufacturer's duty to an injured consumer through the
imposition of heightened burdens of proof.'63 For instance, the proposed
Restatement (Third) of Product Liability would require a plaintiff, in almost
every design defect case, to allege that some alternative safer design
existed. 164 That is, before the factfimder would be allowed to consider the
details of the particular case, the plaintiff would be required to show some
'9 Id. at 158-159.
"6°See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
161 See, e.g. William L.. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
162 See DOBBS, supra note 156, at 792-94.
'6 SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1994).
164 Id. at § 2(b).
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alternative safer design for the product in question.165 Thus, tort reform has,
for the most part, manifested itself in a desire to protect defendants while
achieving certainty. Most importantly for present purposes, "rules" deny the
freedom of the factfinder to decide the particular case before it based upon the
relevant factfinder's sense of fairness.
One might also argue that the development, from the plaintiff's perspec-
tive, of large scale class actions in tort cases is inconsistent with the model of
tort litigation posed here. That is, in large class actions the decision maker
does not consider the details of particular plaintiff's cases but rather considers
the effect the defendant's action had on a class of plaintiffs. The particular
plaintiff gives way to the class so that litigation becomes structural rather than
personal. 16 Of course, one might argue this is the inevitable result of a more
technologically complex society. However, while it is no doubt true that class
action litigation moves away from the individual, it is also true that one of the
methods for handling class action litigation is to select certain representative
plaintiffs who are allowed to present their versions of their cases to the
relevant decision maker. These representative plaintiffs push their own case
as if it was a traditional tort case. The individuals act as proxies for the other
plaintiffs who are similarly situated. The representative plaintiff plays the
role of the particular plaintiff for the court in the particular law suit. The
particular plaintiff allows the court to deal with the complex matter in a
method akin to the traditional face-to-face, one-on-one tort case.
Where are we then? The purpose of this short section-has been to point
out that indeed, there are, or have been, some "rules" in tort cases. These
rules can be applied evenhandedly in an apparently rational manner. Interest-
ingly, most of these rules traditionally resulted in no recovery. Importantly,
all of these rules deny the plaintiff his or her right to tell his or her particular
story to the particular factfinder whose job it is to decide the case. These rules
deny the parties the opportunity, in the particular case, to present their
particular narratives against the backdrop of the normally general and vague
standards of tort law. Put differently, these rules result in limiting the power
of the relevant decision maker to apply its sense of justice, fairness, and
dramatic resolve to the details of the particular case. The detail of the
particular case, normally the predominate factor in any personal injury action,
gives way to the generalities out of which the particular legal rule arose.
While many of these rules have eroded, or disappeared entirely, the phenom-
ena of tort reform and complex litigation have presented us with new sest of
challenges to the vague particularity of tort law.
'6 See also La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.56(1) (West 1995).
" On structural litigation generally see Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-
Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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VI. TRAGEDY IN TORTS
In a play, the actors say their lines; the plot unfolds. The audience
watches. The audience focuses on the detail of the dramatic presentation. It
becomes involved with the characters. No doubt, the audience has hopes and
wishes for happy endings or just desserts. However, when the play is over, if
it is successful as a dramatic form, the audience, which was focused on the
detail of the production, begins to abstract from the characters and their
particular situations.
The audience, through its focus upon the detailed experiences of the
particular characters who populated the play, may gain some more general
insight into the literary vehicle, human nature, or life. Perhaps by focusing on
the particular personae populating the production the audience learned
something about itself. The lessons for the audience may be individual, (I
learned something about my own nature), communal (I learned something
about the community of which we are all apart) or metaphysical (so that's the
meaning of life after all). As such, the audience may have come to see some
common link between the characters portrayed and themselves. By seeing this
common link, the audience may, in fact, see some commonality between all
humanity, what Professor Bender calls our "interconnectedness."' 67 The
purpose of the literary vehicle then, in part, is to make one aware of intercon-
nectedness via the rich presentation of detail about a particular character. It
is my contention that the richer the detail the more realistic the character
appears. The more realistic the character, the more likely one is to see the
impact of life on that person, thereby learning some larger lesson which
applies not just to that person but to all of us. Thus, ironically, the focus on
detail leads to a lesson of universal application.
Now, let me note some general points regarding the dramatic form
known as tragedy. The laymen may think of tragedy as something sad or to
be regretted. However, the dramatic theorist is not so sentimental. Professor
Richard H. Palmer defines tragedy as follows: "Tragedy is a dramatic form
that stimulates a response of intense, interdependent, and inseparably bal-
anced attraction and repulsion."' 8 Let me focus on what Palmer calls the
inseparably balanced attraction and repulsion which he also calls the "ambiva-
lent" response.69 The ambivalence in the tragic form is that the drama evokes
a feeling in the audience that is inevitably inconsistent. That is, the feeling
calls up elements in opposition. It calls up mutually repugnant forces.
Perhaps, tragedy is a dramatic form which shows us that opposites attract. It
167 See Bender, supra note 60, at 28-30.





is a dramatic form that induces a feeling of positive and negative, yin and
yang, good and bad. That is, it reduces itself to some mutually independent,
inconsistent, dialectal.
171
The tragic form presents the audience with conflicting feelings which,
while rationally irreconcilable, still may evoke some conciliatory response in
the observer who realizes, through the art form, that apparent irreconcilability
is merely a tangible incarnation of some greater whole.
Let me return to the quote from Ms. Armstrong which I set forth in the
Introduction. You will recall Ms. Armstrong stated that tragedy "effected a
purification (catharsis) of the emotions of terror and pity that amounted to an
experience of rebirth."17' The audience is reformed by some reconciliation of
inconsistent emotions through the observation and study of the drama. The
observer is able to see some "truth," a religious truth according to Ms.
Armstrong, via "a symbolic, mythical or ritual presentation of events that
would be unendurable in daily life." 172 Now, let me return to personal injury
litigation.
Personal injury cases, as I noted at the beginning, are frequently compel-
ling. Like the best stories, they draw out the detail of the case. Society
observes, like the audience at a movie or play. This is even true of the reader
of the appellate opinion. It is most definitely true for the juror observing the
personal dramas unfolding. The feelings evoked by the facts of tort cases are
often intense. Moreover, the parties present their cases in a form akin to the
dramatic. The plaintiff brings his or her witnesses and presents their testi-
mony. The defendant follows suit. The presentation is a real life drama.
Where does the tragedy come from? Where is the ambivalent? The ambiva-
lence comes from the inevitable resolution of conflicting views of the evidence
and of the just outcome. The plaintiff's presentation pulls at the emotions and
sensibilities of the jury in one direction. The defendant's presentation tugs at
those same emotions and sensibilities in a different direction. Like the
audience in any tragedy, the jury is pulled in two different directions at once.
The particular details of the personal injury drama before them pulls individ-
ual jurors in different directions. It forces them to resolve the contrary forces
at work in the courtroom. Resolution has its practical manifestation in the
decisionmaker's judgment in the particular case. That resolution is concrete;
it is not metaphysical.
170 Thus, in THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY, Nietzsche deals with the innately conflicting App-
olonian and Dionysian forces. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH W. NIETzscHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY
(1974) (dealing with the innately conflicting Appolonian and Dionysian forces); see also DAVID
LENSON, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY-A COMMENTARY (1987).
171 ARMSTRONG, supra note 4, at 37.
172 Id.
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Interestingly, Professor Ernest Weinrib of the University of Toronto, in
a series of recent articles, has turned to Aristotle to provide a formal theory of
modern tort law. 73 According to Weinrib, tort law may be explained by
Aristotelian notions of corrective justice, the purpose of tort law being to
restore the parties to their pretort transactional equality. 174 Tort law strives to
restore the parties to an equality of holdings.'75 Importantly, Weinrib points
out that one of the key characteristics of corrective justice (and tort law) which
arises out of Aristotle's conception of corrective justice is the bi-polarity of
tort litigation. 76 This bi-polarity manifests itself in the bi-polarity of the
parties 177 and the bi-polarity of the remedy.17 1 Interestingly, it is Aristotle's
classic theory of tragedy which Ms. Armstrong cited in the material I quoted
in the Introduction and have referred to in this section. It is Aristotle who
pointed out the importance of the cathartic experience brought about by the
seemingly opposite emotions of pity and terror. Thus, there is a bi-polarity
between pity and terror which bi-polarity is resolved, albeit metaphorically, in
the tragedy. Likewise, in the tort case, there is a bi-polarity between the
plaintiff and defendant, which is resolved through the decisionmaker's
resolution of the particular case.
But how do the general standards, as opposed to particular rules of tort
law, come into play? What allows the jury to resolve the bi-polar puzzle
which the tort case presents to it in a meaningful manner is the generality of
the applicable rules. Thus, the jury, or other relevant decision-maker is not
bound by some particular legal dogma. Rather, the decision maker is asked to
apply generalized standards to the details of the cases before it. The decision
maker is resolving what at first blush would appear to be irreconcilable. As
a result, being able to think metaphorically,'79 and not merely logically, has
" See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.
J. 277 (1994).
"7 See, e.g.,Weinrib, supra note 18, at 407-09.
175 Id.
176Id. at 409-11.
177 d. at 409.
17' Id. at 410.
171 See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537
(1972). Fletcher says:
Metaphors and causal imagery may represent a mode of thought that appears insuffi-
ciently rational in an era dominated by technological processes. Yet why should the
rhetoric of reasonableness and foreseeability appeal to lawyers as a more scientific or
precise way of thinking?
The courts face the choice. Should they surrender the individual to the demands of
maximizing utility? Or should they continue to protect individual interests in the face of
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some benefit. The standards of tort law tolerate and allow metaphoric
thinking and application. Metaphoric application leads to resolution and
perhaps to some greater truth.
Let me now step back. I have focused on the decisionmaker as the
audience in a personal injury drama. This is most definitely true. However,
in another sense, the decisionmaker may be more like the chorus in a Greek
tragedy, the character with no name, the character who helps the viewing
audience gain some further insight into whatever aspect of human nature that
was brought to the surface by the tragedy. Who then is the audience? Viewed
thusly, the tort audience is the society which observes the entire proceeding,
including the result reached by the decision maker/chorus. In short, personal
injury law mirrors a dramatic form where the ambivalent forces at work in a
dangerous society play themselves out. It is the arena where progress is
balanced against personal injury. It is the forum where values collide.
The generality of the standards normally employed in tort law allows
both the decisionmaker and the society to flexibly respond to the compelling
details of particular tort cases as they arise. To the extent general standards
are replaced by particular rules or to the extent we tend to focus on broad
classes of individuals, as plaintiffs or defendants, rather than as particular
individuals before the court, we run grave risks.
To the extent we abandon the rich, specific detail of tort litigation for
rules or for class litigation we run the risk of missing the depth of the fabric
of personal injuries that particular detail provides. The abstraction from the
particular to the general becomes meaningfully possible only when the
particular is painted with sufficient detail to make it compelling. The compas-
sionate response of the community depends upon an empathic response to the
relevant actors. The response increases as we see those actors, characters, or
parties, as living, breathing, real persons like ourselves. Particularity breeds
generality. Alternatively, generality without particularly may well breed
isolation and apathy.
community needs? To do the latter, courts and lawyers may well have to perceive the
link between achieving their substantive goals and explicating their value choices in a
simpler, sometimes metaphoric style of reasoning.
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